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Democracy & Political Religion
Some Thoughts on the Controversy between Dewey and Niebuhr
Magnus Schlette
 
1. The Politics of Individualism
1 In  1930,  invited  to  contribute  to  an  anthology  collecting  personal  statements  of
contemporary  American  philosophers,  John  Dewey  chose  to  entitle  his  brief
autobiographical  essay  “From  Absolutism  to  Experimentalism”  (LW  5:  147ff.).  He
thereby alluded to a fundamental shift in his intellectual self-understanding, which had
departed from a Hegelian-style idealism and had led via William James to the formation
of the corner stones of 20th-century pragmatism. What Dewey calls “absolutism” in his
essay, stands for the anachronistic idea of an intellectual orientation to life that claims
to  found  life-worldly  experience  on  the  insights  of  a  self-sufficient  rationality.
“Experimentalism,”  to  the  contrary,  denotes  an  intellectual  orientation  directed
toward  empirical  inquiry  into  the  ever-changing  conditions  of  situation-bound
problem-solving. With reference to the title of his 1928, through 1929, Gifford Lectures
at the University of Edinburgh this shift may be grasped in terms of a changing quest
for certainty. Dewey does not abstractly deny man’s quest for certainty within a to-all-
appearances contingent world, but he refutes the traditional satisfaction of this quest
by stating foundations of common knowledge that are prior to trial and immune to
error. In the wake of Darwinism, Dewey wants to guide his contemporaries from their
subjection to seemingly steady transempirical fundaments of knowledge about their
theoretical and practical affairs toward a growth of empowerment derived from their
own  hitherto  successful  history  of  empirical  probation.  The  traditional  quest  for
certainty, which seeks reliance on authorities external to experience, is sublated into a
quest for self-reliance through experience. The self-reliant individual or collective seeks
to expand the range of new experiences as the only promising source of learning about
the requirements of concrete situations for adaption and control.
2 Dewey’s concept of experimentalism refers to a practical  attitude toward the world
with  clearly  Emersonian roots  in  the  ideas,  firstly,  of  experience  as  openness  to  the
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unforeseen,  allowing,  secondly,  growth  as  human’s  striving  for  a  higher  degree  of
perfectibility in  mastering  critical  encounters  with  the  world,  and  thereby,  thirdly,
allowing self-realization or self-determination in terms of an increasing independence
from traditional, institutional or otherwise authoritarian constraints to the range of
problem-solving  activities.  The  self-reliance,  enacted  in  these  three  features  of
experimentalism: openness to future, perfectibility, and self-realization, is nevertheless
itself dependent on the rise of the particular methodical and institutional framework,
delivered by science and democracy. Both are interrelational achievements of western
modernity:  The  term  “science,”  on  the  one  hand,  denotes  a  specific  procedure of
cooperativity among the members of  the scientific  community,  which is  qualified by
critical  observation  of  it’s  object,  by  controlled  theoretical  generalization  from
observed particulars corresponding to the tested and proven knowledge derived from
previous  experience,  and  by  the  repeated  attempt  of  falsifying  hitherto  accepted
hypotheseis.  The term “democracy,”  on the other hand,  refers  to a  specific  form of
cooperativeness, based on the willingness of engaging into a common good, of taking the
attitude of the other, and of searching for the realization of common goals on the way
of establishing consent.
3 Dewey’s  understanding  of  science  and  democracy  transcends  the  familiar  range  of
meaning no less than his idea of experimentalism. They are used in terms of scientific –
respectively democratic – attitudes toward life, both supplementing each other. The
democratic attitude calls for equal integration of other perspectives in contradiction
and  consent  to  broaden  the  range  of  insight  into  the  problems  individuals  and
collectives face during their confrontation with reality and into the possible solutions
for  those  problems;  the  scientific  attitude,  on  the other  hand,  calls  for  a  critical
assessment of the very object that is democratically negotiated from different vantage
points.  The  scientific  community  seems  to  be  Dewey’s  paradigm  for  his  idea  of
experimentalism that he seeks to establish in society. It anticipates Dewey’s social ideal
for  a  specifically  modern  society  based  on  the  attitudes  of  openness  to  future,
perfectibility and self-realization of individuals and collectives in orientation toward
common goods. In as much as this society is constituted by individuals or collectives
whose ratio is the establishment of openness to future, the increase of perfectibility,
and the  consummation  of  self-realization  in  orientation  toward  common  goods,  it
institutionally embodies, what Dewey has also called a “new individualism,” meaning a
habitually scientified and democratized individualism (cf. LW 5: 41-123).
4 The idea of a “new individualism” in contrast to the “old individualism” of foregone
times  is  set  forth  within  a  concrete  historical  context,  namely  within  the
transformation of the American society from a loose aggregation of pioneers, pursuing
happiness on their way to the moving frontier of land and possibilities,  toward the
increasingly dense-populated, infra-structurally mobilized and industrialized “United
States,  Incorporated”  (ibid.:  58ff.).  Already  Henry  David  Thoreau  was  aware  of  the
anachronism in his idea of a secluded life on the shores of Walden Pond. His essay
Walden reflects  the  irrevocable  end  of  the  pioneer’s  age,  transforming  the  move
forward into the open land to an inward journey seeking to poetically reestablish the
autarky  that  had  been  lost  in  the  process  of  nation  building.  Modern  life  is
characterized  by  the  division,  rationalization  and  capitalization  of  labor  and  the
formation of mass consumption as the basis of economic growth, as Dewey points out
in a series of articles under the title “Individualism, Old and New,” published in New
Republic around the outbreak of the Great Depression. According to Dewey the United
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States  “has  steadily  moved from an earlier  pioneer  individualism to  a  condition of
dominant corporateness. The influence business corporations exercise in determining
present industrial and economic activities is both a cause and a symbol of the tendency
to combination in all phases of life.” (Ibid.: 58).
5 Under  the  given  circumstances  the  old  individualism,  based  on  the  idea  of  the
individuals as independent entities seeking equal opportunities and free associations in
pursuing  their  self-interests  has  been  perverted  “to  conform  to  the  practices  of  a
pecuniary  culture”  (ibid.:  49).  In  modern  American  life  the  pioneer  individualism
turned  into  an  economic  liberalism  with  a  dominating  orientation  toward  profit
maximization  through  satisfaction  of  material  wants.  Greed  for  profit  and  mass
consumption  are  interrelated:  “Prosperity  is  our  God”  –  as  Dewey  summarizes  his
argumentation in an essay entitled “A Critique of American Civilization” (LW 3: 140).
But  other than Thoreau,  Dewey does not  indulge in an Americanized locus  amoenus
where  the  old  individualism  may  come  to  flourish  again.  Instead  of  searching  for
seclusion from every man’s life to rescue the true essence of old pioneer individualism,
Dewey suggests to adapt individualism to the new environment of industrialized mass
civilization.  Since  cooperativeness  is  inevitable  in  modern  life,  the  individualistic
pursuit  of  self-interest  is  called  upon  to  explore  goals  of  self-interest  whose
achievement is not just instrumentally but intrinsically bound to the cooperation with
our co-individuals. 
 
2. The Religion of Individualism
6 During his whole life Dewey was faithful to his idea of “an individualism in democracy,”
which  is,  as  already  young  Dewey  points  out  in  his  early  essay  “The  Ethics  of
Democracy,” “an individualism of freedom, of responsibility, of initiative to and for the
ethical  ideal,  not an individualism of lawlessness” (EW 1:  244).  Later on,  Dewey will
consolidate his  conviction that only joint  cooperation,  as  it  is  institutionalized in a
democratic  culture,  brings  the  potentialities  of  the  individual  to  full  blooming and
allows him self-realization.  The reason for  the attainability  of  a  principal  harmony
between  individuals  and  community  is,  that  individuation,  according  to  Dewey,
depends on reciprocal recognition of each other’s efforts to lead one’s life,  and the
chance of being recognized for what we do is the greater the more cooperatively our
goals  are  designed  (cf.  Honneth  2000,  II.).  Knowledge,  science-based,  methodically
achieved and tested, is  the means for the individuals and collectives to explore the
ethical ideals and the constraints, which the common endeavor has to face on a daily
basis. In Philosophy and Civilization from the early Thirties Dewey demands the use of all
intellectual resources to achieve organized social planning and control. 
7 Dewey’s  attentiveness  to  an  improvement  of  the  individual’s  living  conditions  via
science-based social planning may certainly be interpreted as an indication that “he
appears  to  be  returning  to  the  eighteenth-century  French  Enlightenment  in  his
conviction of a rational world responsive to scientific manipulation,” as John Patrick
Diggins has put it (Diggins 1994: 304). Dewey’s explicit reference to Condorcet fits into
this  picture.  The  emphasis  on  resistances  to  progression  deriving  from  “a  lot  of
outworn traditions,  moth-eaten slogans and catchwords that  do substitute  duty for
thought” (LW 6: 61),  words, which clearly imply a poignant allusion to religion and
metaphysics,  show a  similarity  in  tone  and content  to  Auguste  Comte’s  positivism.
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Reinhold Niebuhr, contemporary of Dewey, Professor of Theology at Union Seminary in
New York just  across  from Columbia where Dewey taught during the time of  their
controversy, and next to Dewey one of the significant intellectuals in the United States
of that time, was the first to raise this point with critical intention. With reference to
Philosophy and Civilization he takes Dewey to be the most eloquent among the naïve
liberal intellectuals who are still “enmeshed in the illusions and sentimentalities of the
Age of Reason” (Niebuhr 2015:  149).  Dewey serves Niebuhr repeatedly as a primary
target for his polemic against all strands of thought that claim steady progress in the
process  of  civilization,  leading  to  a  growing  congruency  between  self-interest  and
common good. The title of Niebuhr’s book Moral  Man and Immoral  Society from 1932
formulates his principal standpoint. Niebuhr does not see society as a stable framework
of  institutionalized  moral  standards  serving  the  function  of  taming man’s  immoral
inclinations. To the contrary, it is the individual’s inclination toward the good, which is
endangered by  any sort  of  social  agglomeration.  Collectives  tend to  dampen man’s
disposition to do the right thing, and to strengthen his egocentric instincts, which are
pursued with greater strength by aggregation of interest. Dewey, according to Niebuhr,
fails to acknowledge this.
8 Dewey firmly and rightly rejected Niebuhr’s accusation (cf. LW 9: 71-5; 107-11). He was
well aware of social struggles and the perseverance of inequality. With good reason he
also did not want to be counted among the sentimental  liberals  of  their  time,  who
believed in a somewhat pre-established route to betterment as French enlightenment
thinkers like Condorcet, Turgot and, in their succession, Auguste Comte were inclined
to  do.  Dewey’s  experimentalism  comes  with  ethical  meliorism,  which  does  neither
exclude the possibility of cultural progress nor state it as a matter of fact. “Just because
dominant  economic  interests  are  the  chief  cause  for  non-use  of  the  method  of
intelligence to control social  change,” Dewey replied to Niebuhr, “opponents of the
method play into the hands of those interests when they discourage the potentialities
of  this  method”  (LW 9:  110).  Nevertheless  the  charge  of  progressivism  has  been
variously repeated during the many decades of Dewey-scholarship. The general unease
with Dewey’s experimentalism has been pointed out more recently by Eric MacGilvray:
“Dewey’s  own faith in the experimental  ideal  rests  upon three related assumptions
about the nature of reality,” says MacGilvray:  “that it  has a fundamentally rational
character, that its rational character can be grasped by unaided human reason, and
that we can ultimately (and perhaps only) grasp its rational character in common.”
(MacGilvray 2004: 130).
9 MacGilvray is mistaken in a small, though essential detail: Dewey’s experimental ideal
does not rest on the aforesaid assumptions, but it consists of them. Despite of being well
founded  in  an  accumulated  history  of  practical  probation,  the  content  of  these
assumptions is far from being factual. This makes them to objects of faith, which, again,
is understated as an intellectual commitment to empirically formed convictions. Faith,
according to Dewey, is a counterfactual commitment to an ideal – “counterfactual” not
meaning:  in opposition to the factual,  but in the sense of  being no subject  to final
verification.  According  to  Dewey’s  A  Common  Faith,  his  brief  contribution  to  the
philosophy of religion, faith is qualified by the kind of experience, which accompanies
its attitude. Dewey paraphrases this experience as “being conquered, vanquished, in
our active nature by an ideal end”; according to Dewey “it signifies acknowledgement
of its rightful claim over our desires and purposes” (Dewey 1960 [1934]: 20) that unifies
the self and evokes a feeling of harmony with the universe (ibid.: 22f.). He calls faith the
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unification of the self “through allegiance to inclusive ideal ends, which imagination
presents to us and to which the human will  responds as worthy of  controlling our
desires and choices” (ibid.: 33). Dewey does not state but postulates the fundamentally
rational character of reality as well as the congruency between its rational structure on
the one side and common human reason on the other. The postulate embodies the ideal
that there shall be a world, based on the harmony of reality, mind and action. And as
such it bears consequences for the factual. Experimentalism and meliorism are ways of
“applying” the ideal to everyday life, they are ways of authenticating the binding force
of the postulate, and at the same time – much in contrast to a positivist account of
progress – they attest the precarity of man’s future.
10 After all, Dewey and Niebuhr do not seem to be as far apart from each other than both
have persistently claimed. Niebuhr’s insinuation that Dewey belongs to the group of
sentimental liberals who believe in a teleological process of science-based betterment
misses the point of experimentalism; Dewey is no less aware of the social inequalities
and struggles than Niebuhr. And most importantly both believe in a faith-bound vigor
as being indispensible for the mobilization of all efforts in pursuing the common good
under recalcitrant conditions. “[F]or justice,” Niebuhr concludes his thought in Moral
Man and Immoral Society, “cannot be approximated if the hope of its perfect realization
does  not  generate  a  sublime  madness  of  the  soul”  (Niebuhr  2015:  350).  The
approximation of justice may stand here as an exemplification of the general striving
for the common good. Niebuhr emphasizes the perlocutionary force mobilized by faith
that may carry the individuals beyond their immediate goals.  What Niebuhr calls  a
“sublime madness of the soul” is structurally similar to the consummatory dimension
of  faithful  action  that  according  to  Dewey  unifies  the  self  in  his  cooperative
engagement  for  the  ideal  on  the  paths  of  scientific  experimentalism  and  ethical
meliorism.
11 For Dewey the ideal as such has neither a mere subjective reality in the mind nor a
substantive reality within some remote ontological sphere, but an operative reality “in
character,  in personality and action” (Dewey 1960 [1934]:  48).  Dewey’s focus on the
operative reality of whatever we are faithful about lends a kind of self-reference to our
faith: Its object is being enacted in the dispositional quality of our actions while we
strive to realize it. In other words, as the intentional object of faithful action the ideal is
already present in the way we exercise whatever we do to realize it; yet it may never be
fully  embodied  in  any  particular  result  of  our  doings.  Dewey  suggests  a  process-
oriented understanding of the ideal in terms of “idealizing” our actions through faith.
This seems to be very near to what Niebuhr means, when he claims, “the vision of a just
society is an impossible one, which can be approximated only by those who do not
regard  it  as  impossible”  (Niebuhr  2015:  208).  The  dialectic  of  the  possible and  the
impossible grasps the idea of approaching the common good via determinate negation
of any claim to have reached it. And again, both, Dewey and Niebuhr, call this faith into
the  impossible,  qualified  by  “the  sublime  madness”  (ibid.:  350;  see  above)  of  “being
conquered, vanquished, in our active nature by an ideal end” (Dewey 1960 [1934]: 20;
see above) most concordantly a religious attitude toward life. 
12 In fact, calling it religious is too vague and underestimates its specific dynamic. The
ideals,  whose  final  realization  is  principally  beyond  the  possibility  of  empirical
indication, let alone evidence, but which, nevertheless, are exercising a binding force
on our practical orientation, qualify a very specific religious disposition. It combines
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ultimate concern with a futuristic orientation, anticipating a turn of eras that despite
of its expectation is not subject to prognosis on the basis of empirical knowledge. May
betterment be advanced only by small changes, progress repeatedly be conveyed by
steps backwards, never secured and always at risk – according to the disposition in
question the very possibility that there is betterment at all, the conviction that progress
is  not  wholly  illusionary,  is  not  enlivened  by  the  deduction  of  probabilities  from
historical evidence like, for example, in Kant’s moderate hope for progress, but by a
common faith into an order wholly different from our empirically known dimensions.
This disposition may be appropriately characterized as eschatological. For eschatology
denotes the expectation of a consummatory state of being, which will once come into
existence.  It  is  the eschatological  force of  faith that  according to  Dewey as  well  as
Niebuhr moves history toward the common good. But then, again, is the controversy
between Dewey and Niebuhr just a case of mutual misunderstanding?
 
3. The Politics of Religion
13 In 1928, Dewey joins a group of western intellectuals who follow an official invitation of
the Soviet Union, to inform themselves about the transformation of Russian society. He
visits schools and industrial sites, talks with workers and representatives of the Russian
government – and returns to the U.S. in a state of excitement. Russia was about to
undertake a great psychological experiment, he reports in a series of articles published
in  New  Republic (LW 3:  243).  Its  goal  was  to  find  out,  Dewey  writes,  whether  the
democratic ideals of freedom, equality and fraternity could be most completely realized
in a political community based on the abolition of private property and on the common
control  and  administration  of  the  industry  by  the  workers.  Despite  its  oppressive
government  he  praises  contemporary  communist  Russia  for  the  efforts  to  use
coordinated knowledge and technological expertise to steer economy in the interest of
social  order  and  stability.  Dewey-critics  such  as  Diggins  may  refer  to  Dewey’s
excitement about Russia’s “great psychological experiment” as just another evidence
for  his  enlightenment-based  technocratic  positivism.  After  all,  also  the  Leninist
transformation  of  Russian  society  is  indebted  to  this  particular  tradition  of
enlightenment thought.
14 But wouldn’t we rather think of this as an economic or political than a psychological
experiment?  According  to  Dewey  the  whole  point  of  the  Russian  event  would  be
missed, if it were reduced to a mere socio-structural transformation. Most of all Dewey
is fascinated by the passion, which enlivens the mostly younger population in taking
the economical challenge. And he interprets it as a genuinely religious phenomenon
(ibid.:  245).  He claims to have witnessed a joint faith among the Russians, which he
compares  to  the  spirit  of  Early  Christianity.  The  comparison  clearly  stresses  the
eschatological  dimension of  the supposed common faith among the Russian people.
According to Dewey this faith integrated the individual into an organic movement to
the betterment of society. He does also notice the discrepancy between the vitality and
creativity of the common faith on the one side, and the dogmatism of Marxist doctrine
on the other. But at that point he is still optimistic that the “soviet official theology”
(ibid.: 246) will slowly adapt to the innovative potential that rises bottom up from the
religious movement of the Russian people.
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15 For Dewey the Soviet experiment is interesting, of course, as a paradigm case for the
conditions of a great social transformation, which he also hoped for in the U.S. By no
means he wants to turn America into a Soviet state. To the contrary, he is doubtlessly
true to the foundations of American democracy. But he also sees them endangered by
the irrational and uncontrolled forces of social modernization. What he witnessed in
Russia,  is  a  concrete historical  case of  Niebuhr’s  “sublime madness of  the soul,”  in
Dewey’s terms: of an experience of “being conquered, vanquished, in our active nature
by an ideal end.” But Niebuhr, where he appealed to the “sublime madness of the soul,”
did not hesitate to add that it “is dangerous because it encourages terrible fanaticisms.
It must therefore be brought under the control of reason” (Niebuhr 2015: 350). The
essential point of difference between Dewey and Niebuhr concerns the question of how
to tame the eschatological furor, once it has been unleashed by religious stimulation of
man’s imagination.  His further intellectual  development brings Niebuhr to seek the
answer to this question in positive religion, more precisely: in an orthodox Lutheran
version of biblical faith, whereas Dewey confined himself to the reliance on intellectual
integrity.
16 Let us first focus on Niebuhr: In his two-volume opus magnum from 1939, The Nature and 
Destiny of Man, finished vis-a-vis of the Second World War, he had come to adopt the
biblical anthropology, which understands man at the same time as an image of God and
as subject to original sin. Being God’s creation, according to Niebuhr’s interpretation of
the biblical narrative, entails man’s faculty of imagining possible worlds, and his
formative power to create and shape his own environment. Original sin, on the other
hand, denotes man’s disposition to suppress his own limitations and to rationalize his
shortcomings as a created being. For Niebuhr, biblical religion serves a twofold and
seemingly paradoxical function: It shall unleash the eschatological furor of treating the
realization of our utmost common goods as objects of ultimate concern, and at the
same time keep this furor under control to prevent it from fanaticism. The history of
Christianity,  according  to  Niebuhr,  has  always  been  endangered  by  a  severe
disturbance of the balance between unleashing and controlling the religious furor. On
the one hand, particularly in the protestant denominations derived from an inward-
directed  sectarianism  that  either  stressed  justificatio and  regeneratio as  positive
experiences of an individualistic transformation to limitless perfectibility or set their
hopes on the collectivistic goal of realizing a perfect society, the eschatological force
had fully displaced the self-denial of the faithful sinner. On the other hand, traditions
inspired by the fall of man to set all his hopes on eternity often enough had slowed
down any dynamic of change, whether on the individual or the collective level. It is
important to see that the specific theology, which Niebuhr adopted during the Thirties,
is designed to articulate his insight into the importance of faith’s eschatological force
on the one hand and his deep skepticism about the range of man’s moral integrity in
joint social action on the other: “It is a good thing to seek for the Kingdom of God on
earth; but it is very dubious to claim to have found it.” (Niebuhr 1996: 178). 
17 Dewey,  to  the contrary,  did not  allow for positive religion to do the job.  From the
standpoint of his Darwinian naturalism all religions appeared to him as anachronistic
institutions worshiping supernatural entities that did not exist. A Common Faith charges
the  traditional  believer  with  a  counterproductive  dualism  of  the  eternal  and  the
worldly affairs which betrays him into inaction, with fanaticisms responsible for bloody
aggressions in the course of history, and, above all, with intellectual dishonesty for his
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stubborn adherence to scientifically outdated convictions. Therefore Dewey was forced
to conceptualize the religious as a, so to speak, freestanding quality that did not have to
be retraced to positive religion as its source. “All religions, marked by elevated ideal
quality,” he writes, “have dwelt upon the power of religion to introduce perspective
into the piecemeal and shifting episodes of existence. Here [...] we need to reverse the
ordinary statement and say that whatever introduces genuine perspective is religious,
not that religion is something that introduces it.” (Dewey 1960 [1934]: 24). Whatever
may  evoke  faith’s  vigor:  neither  its  sources  nor  its  evaluation  shall  be  based  on
religious scripture.
18 Niebuhr  could  certainly  accommodate  Dewey’s  attack  on  religion’s  supposed  bias
toward inaction and aggression. After all, those accusations did not principally debunk
positive religion, but only some of its interpretations in church history; even so there
were enough counter-examples to be referred to, if evidence was demanded. As to the
charge of supernaturalism, Niebuhr replied modestly to Dewey’s A Common Faith. “It is
questionable,”  he  wrote  in  The  Nation on  September  1934,  quite  shortly  after  the
publication  of  Dewey’s  book,  “whether  the  supernature  against  which  Dr.  Dewey
protests,  a  realm  of  being  separate  from  the  natural  world  and  interfering  in  its
process,  is  really  the  kind  of  supernature  about  which  really  profound  prophetic
religion speaks”  (quoted from Rice  1993:  158).  Niebuhr  did  not  think,  that  religion
raises ontological truth claims that intended to compete with science. “Dr. Dewey may
insist that he does not believe in the ideals as ‘antecedently existing actualities’,” he
remarked with reference to Dewey’s paraphrase for the belief of supernaturalism into
godly powers, “but he does believe in a world in which the possibility of realizing ideals
exists.  He believes in appreciating the world of nature as a realm of meaning even
where it does not obviously support man’s moral enterprise but is in conflict with it.
This is the kind of faith which prophetic religion has tried to express mythically and
symbolically by belief in a God who is both the creator and the judge of the world, that
is, both the ground of its existence and its telos.” (Ibid.: 152). According to Niebuhr the
Christian  dualism  of  man’s  god-likeness  and  his  sinfulness,  the  understanding  of
human endeavors as bespeaking the spirit of God as well as being subject to judgement
beyond human measures is an adequate symbolic expression of the political ideals he
principally shares with Dewey.
 
4. Political Religion
19 In  a  nutshell  the  conflict  between  Dewey  and  Niebuhr  is  about  the  eschatological
dimension  of  a  religious  faith  that  shall  serve  the  advancement  of  individual  self-
realization through joint striving for the common good. To evaluate the grounds of
their fundamental differences it has to be taken into account how both understand the
relation between the eschatological dimension of a politically activating faith and the
concept  of  transcendence.  Niebuhr  was  right  in  denying  that  Dewey’s  naturalism
allowed space for “transcendence with a capital T” (cf. Dalferth 2012). But if faithful
reference to a transcendent source of meaning was missing, Niebuhr worried, faith’s
eschatological vigor would lose its humility and sanctify human endeavors. Historical
religions, according to Niebuhr, “are by their very nature prophetic-messianic. They
look forward at first to a point in history and finally towards the eschaton (end) which is
also the end of history, where the full meaning of life and history will be disclosed and
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fulfilled.”  (Niebuhr  1996:  4).  Following  Niebuhr,  the  eschatological  disposition  is
endangered to become destructive, though, when it does not conceptualize the eschaton
as coming from without, which, again, is the case, “wherever the meaning of life is
explained from the standpoint of either nature or supernature in such a way that a
transcendent  revelation  of  history’s  meaning  is  not  regarded  as  either  possible  or
necessary”  (ibid.:  5).  Whereas  in  Christian eschatology the  end of  history  was  both
fulfillment and judgement, the “modern conception sees the end as only fulfillment”
(ibid.: 166).
20 Under these conditions “transcendence with a capital T” may become substituted by
“man’s capacity for freedom and self-transcendence” (ibid.) as the formative power to
create meaning in history. “The ‘idea of progress,’ the most characteristic and firmly
held  article  in  the  credo of  modern  man,  is  the inevitable  philosophy  of  history
emerging from the Renaissance. This result was achieved by combining the classical
confidence in man with the Biblical confidence in the meaningfulness of history.” (Ibid.:
154f.).  Niebuhr does not hesitate to subsume such multifarious expressions like the
early  Italian  Renaissance,  Cartesian  rationalism  and  the  French  enlightenment,
sectarian  perfectionism  and  secular  utopianism  under  his  unifying  principle.
Contemporary Russia, object of Dewey’s admiration, served Niebuhr as an outstanding
example for this kind of religious hubris. His worries are congruent with those of the
Austrian immigrant to the U.S. Eric Voegelin, who shortly after Dewey’s A Common Faith
had published his famous essay Die politischen Religionen, thereby introducing the term
“political religion” into the debate on the origins of totalitarianism.
21 Voegelin subdivides political religions into supramundane and intramundane branches
(Voegelin  2007:  17).  Whereas  the  supramundane  political  religions  accept
“transcendence  with  a  capital  T”  as  the  source  of  the  social  body’s  existence  and
selfunderstanding,  intramundane  religions  are  characterized  by  sanctifying  the
contents  of  the  world  (ibid.:  50).  In  1952,  Voegelin  expanded  the  rather  sketchy
approach of his essay on political religions in his book The New Science of Politics. Here,
he elaborates  the intramundane (political)  religions  under  the name of  Gnosticism:
“Gnostic  speculation  overcame  the  uncertainty  of  faith  by  receding  from 
transcendence and endowing man and his intra-mundane range of action with the
meaning of eschatological fulfilment. In the measure in which this immanentization
progressed  experientially,  civilizational  activity  became  a  mystical  work  of  self-
salvation. The spiritual strength of the soul which in Christianity was devoted to the
sanctification of life could now be diverted into the more appealing, more tangible,
and, above all, so much easier creation of the terrestrial paradise.” (Voegelin 1952: 129).
Gnosticism, in short, refers to the “immanentization of the eschaton” (ibid.: 163). 
22 Voegelin understands the key change in the eschatological paradigm structurally quite
similar  to  Niebuhr:  The  disposition  of  the  religious  mind  that  is  based  on  the
immanentization of the eschaton, is realized in acts of self-transcendence intending to
overcome  the  narrow  borders  of  previous  accomplishments  on  the  path  to  inner-
worldly perfection. After all, there is much in their respective characterization of the
modern  age  that  Niebuhr  and  Voegelin  share.  Both  claim  a  transformation  of
eschatology in the modern age,  substituting transcendence “with a capital  T” for a
concept  of  self-transcendence  respectively  –  borrowing  Georg Simmel’s  term  –  of
“immanent transcendence” (Simmel 1968: 197). Both interpret the millenarian idea of a
Third Age, the Age to the kenosis of the Holy Spirit, produced by 12th century’s mystic
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Joachim of Fiore, as an anticipation of inner-worldly sanctification, which according to
Niebuhr and Voegelin alike characterizes a historic dynamic inherent in supposedly
secular  societies.  Both  refer  to  sectarian  movements  in  early  Protestantism  as
mediators  of  the  great  transformation,  which  lead  to  the  immanentiziation  of  the
Christian eschaton. And both interpret the totalitarian systems of the 20th century as
radical outcomes of this transformation.
23 It  is  particularly  interesting  that  Voegelin  allows  for  a  further  subdivision  of  the
intramundane  branch  of  political  religions.  He  differentiates  between  idealist  and
activist versions of immanentizing the eschaton, which call for a correlating distinction
between two different conceptual accounts of immanent transcendence. “In every wave
of the gnostic movement the progressivist and utopian varieties will tend to form a
political right wing, leaving a good deal of the ultimate perfection to gradual evolution
and compromising  on  a  tension  between achievement  and  ideal,  while  the  activist
variety will tend to form a political left wing, taking violent action toward the complete
realization  of  the  perfect  realm.” (Voegelin  1952:  175).  Whereas  Voegelin  expected
indications  for  the  idealist,  progressivist  version  of  Gnosticism  in  the  political
symbolism of the modern western democracies, he spotted the activist version in the
totalitarian societies of his time. The fundamental difference Voegelin points out, here,
concerns  the  structure  of  transcending  the  factual.  Both  versions  of  the  Gnostic
movement immanentize the eschaton, but whereas the revolutionary interpretation of
the eschaton pushes for the activist  completion of human striving for the ideal,  the
evolutionary interpretation defends the acceptibility of a tension between the factual
and  the  ideal  that  may  not  be  overcome  by  planned  action.  Accordingly,  the
revolutionary  eschatology  conceptualizes  immanent  transcendence  in  terms  of  a
remote state or order of being that will be realized through the full actualization of
man’s  faculties,  thereby  relativizing  transcendence  to  the  status  of  transient  and
actively vanquishable remoteness from the factual. To the contrary, the evolutionary
eschatology accepts the remoteness of the transcendent. Whereas in the case of the
revolutionists the inner-worldly goals are sanctified, in the case of the evolutionists the
ideals  indeed  evoke  the  utmost  commitment  to  particular  goals,  but  allow  the
awareness that the final realization of the ideal may transcend man’s faculties.
24 This distinction in mind, there is good reason to assume that Dewey does uphold a
concept  of  immanent  transcendence  very  similar  to  the  evolutionary  version
introduced by Voegelin. In fact, Dewey might represent a rather sophisticated variant
of  the  evolutionary  stance.  Because  Voegelin  points  out  that  in  contrast  to  the
revolutionary  proponents  of  political  religion  the  evolutionists  were  content with  a
remaining  tension  between  the  accomplished  and  the  ideal.  This  does  not  exactly
correspond  to  Dewey’s  standpoint.  Dewey  is  far  more  skeptical  about  the
immanentization of the eschaton than that.  According to Dewey there is  a principal
incongruity  between  the  factual  and  the  ideal;  furthermore,  it  is  precisely  this
incongruity,  which unleashes  the  eschatological  furor  that  is  so  productive  for  the
accomplishment of particular ends in view. Young Dewey wrote about true religion
with clear reference to Hebrew 11, 1: “She would rise to her divine prerogative of life in
things unseen, and faith in things yet unrevealed to sense.” (Quoted from Kestenbaum
2002:  177).  And  fifty  years  later,  in  A  Common  Faith,  we  read:  “Faith  is  a  kind  of
anticipatory vision of things that are now invisible because of the limitations of our
finite  and  erring  nature.”  (Ibid.:  183).  The  deictical  expressions  “yet”  and  “now”
indicate the principal incongruity between the factual and the ideal – you cannot reply:
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“May be not yet unrevealed, now still invisible, but wait fifty years.” There is a strong
sense  of  humility  in  Dewey’s  concept  of  faith  that  impedes  the  sacralization  of
cooperative strivings for the common good. 
25 Therefore  Dewey’s  evolutionary  understanding  of  the  ideal’s  operative  reality  “in
character, in personality and action” (Dewey 1960 [1934]: 48) is fully compatible with
his experimentalist and meliorist skepticism against simple-minded progressivism. His
concept of immanent transcendence does not just allow for the tension between the
factual and the ideal, it rather demands it. Given this reservation it seems by all means
plausible, anyhow, to view Dewey’s A Common Faith as the philosophical articulation of a
particularly  American,  democratic  version  of  evolutionary  intramundane  political
religion,  a  version  that  Robert  Bellah  (himself  referring  back  to  Rousseau)  coined
America’s civil religion. Bellah’s relation to Dewey was ambivalent, though. On the one
hand he paraphrases Dewey’s humanism benevolently as seeing “the religious attitude
carried in all spheres of life, an open-ended quest to realize the highest ideal values of
our common humanity” (Bellah 1986: 82). But he hesitates to attest Dewey’s “religion of
democracy,”  as  he  also  calls  it  (Bellah  2006b:  465),  its  suitability  as  a  proper
conceptualization of America’s civil religion. Why so? The arguments sound similar to
those  put  forward  by  Niebuhr  and  Voegelin  against  the  immanentization  of  the
eschaton. In his meanwhile classical essays on civil religion from the 1960’s and 1970’s
Bellah points  out  that  America’s  civil  religion was the authentic  apprehension of  a
universal and transcendent reality, as it has revealed itself in the common experience
of the American people (Bellah 2006a: 238). Without any consciousness of the nation
standing under a “higher judgement” (ibid.: 244) the tradition of civil religion would
become dangerous, but the concept of God according to Bellah, had always been its
central symbol. To the contrary, in Dewey’s version of a political religion the concept of
God  was  dispensable,  if  not  a  hindrance  to  the  full  expression  of  the  core  of
religiousness.
26 Worshipping the nation as well as legitimizing an imperial raison d’être, which would
hide  political  purposes  behind  an  aura  of  sacredness  and  thereby  immunize  them
against public debate and criticism – according to Bellah these were the perils of an
American  civil  religion  without  reference  to  transcendence  “with  a  capital  T.”
Community  formation  through  a  common  faith  should  rather  be  mediated  by  the
accountability of each individual’s conscience to a higher instance than the particular
mundane jurisdiction, in which the body politic has been institutionalized. Even if we
consider  that  Dewey’s  version  of  an  evolutionary  intramundane  political  religion
differs from the aforesaid revolutionary versions of immanentizing the eschaton, which
according  to  Voegelin  and  Niebuhr  alike  endanger  modern  civilization,  it  remains
questionable,  whether Dewey’s concept of  religion may meet Bellah’s  requirements.
One might make Hans Joas’  point that Dewey “skips over the particularism of each
individual experience and lands […] in an empty universalism of the democratic ideal”
(Joas 2000: 123). According to Joas the motivating force of this merely formal concept
remains  unfathomable.  Therefore,  the  resilience  of  a  Dewey-style  political  religion
against the sanctification of the factual lacks a symbolic medium that would support
modes  of  self-distancing  and  thereby  help  to  balance  the  eschatological  vigor
unleashed by the common faith. The problem may very well be illustrated by reference
to the Christian idea of grace. It implies, as Niebuhr reminds us, the recognition of a
hiatus  “between  the  knowledge  of  the  good  and  the  power  to  do  it”;  modern
conceptions of the conditio humana since the Renaissance era, to the contrary, believed,
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says Niebuhr, “that man has capacities in himself (either rational or mystical) adequate
for the fulfillment of life’s most transcendent goals. Here the Renaissance is equally
definitive for modern spirituality.” (Niebuhr 1996: 153f.). The dismissal of the idea of
grace  takes  away  a  central  symbolic  means  of  articulating  self-distancing  and
skepticism about man’s powers to achieve his goals. The problem of Dewey’s common
faith is that it lacks a functional equivalent to the symbolic means of self-distancing
which are offered by concepts of transcendence “with a capital T.” For sure, Dewey’s
common faith is leashed by fallibilism as a central feature of democratic experience.
But it does not offer a reservoir of symbolic means to articulate and habitualize a self-
image of man that would consolidate and strengthen the fallibilistic attitude as against
the vigor of self-transcendence. The commitment to a fallibilistic stance might not be a
self-sustaining principle in the conduct of life, and this seems to be the by all means
plausible core of Niebuhr’s occasionally unfair criticism of Dewey.
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ABSTRACTS
This article focuses on the controversy between Reinhold Niebuhr and John Dewey about the
function  of  religion  and  religious  institutions  in  a  democratic  society.  It  shows  how  Dewey
positions his concept of a “common faith” within his project of democratic experimentalism,
before  revisiting  Niebuhr’s  criticism  of  this  concept  and  particularly  its  anthropological
inclinations.  Subsequently,  the  article  highlights  the  affinity  of  Niebuhr’s  interpretation  of
Dewey’s  A  Common  Faith to  Eric  Voegelin’s  concept  of  political  religions  and  compares  the
different concepts of transcendence involved in Dewey’s and Niebuhr’s thinking (with special
focus on Niebuhr’s The Nature and Destiny of Man). Niebuhr’s accusation of a shallow progressivism
against Dewey is refuted with reference to Dewey’s concept of immanent transcendence. Finally,
the potential of Dewey’s A Common Faith for the clarification of the concept of civil religion is
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